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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
I. LANDOWNERS RECOVER ON COMMON-LAW THEORIES FOR
IMPROPER DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
In Shockley v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.,' the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina upheld a $250,000 jury verdict against
Hoechst Celanese Corporation ("Hoechst Celanese") and other defendants. 2
The plaintiffs accused the defendants of contaminating groundwater in Greer,
South Carolina, by failing to properly dispose of hazardous waste materials.3
The plaintiffs, who owned property near the contaminated groundwater,
prevailed using common-law theories of strict liability, trespass, nuisance, and
negligence.4 The district court found sufficient evidence existed under all of
the plaintiffs' theories and denied the defendants' renewed motions for
judgment as a matter of law.'
Although numerous defendants were present in the jury trial, only
Hoechst Celanese and William H. Groce, III ("Groce") litigated the motions
for judgment as a matter of law.6 Groce, a former chemist of Hoechst
Celanese, opened a chemical reclamation plant across the street from the
Hoechst Celanese plant. Groce accepted and stored rusty, leaking barrels
containing hazardous chemicals for Hoechst Celanese. During the operation
of Groce's facility, certain ultrahazardous chemicals spilled onto his property.
After five years in business, Groce closed the reclamation plant and sold the
property to Hoechst Celanese, who subsequently paved it for use as a parking
lot. The plaintiff landowners purchased property adjacent to the parking lot
intending to develop a residential subdivision. The chemicals that spilled at
the Groce site ultimately contaminated the groundwater below the parking lot,
and the contamination subsequently migrated to the landowners' property.
1. 793 F. Supp. 670 (D.S.C. 1992), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 996 F.2d 1212 (4th Cir.
1993) (Table) (unpublished opinion available on WESTLAW, Nos. 92-1521, 92-1543, 1993 WL
241179 (4th Cir. June 28, 1993)). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Shockley decision insofar as
it upheld the defendants' liability under the common law theories of trespass, nuisance, and
negligence. Shockley v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., Nos. 92-1521, 92-1543, 1993 WL 241179,
at *5 (4th Cir. June 28, 1993). However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the portion of the Shockley
decision that held the defendants strictly liable. Id.
2. Shockley, 793 F. Supp. at 672.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 675. At the time of the district court's decision, both plaintiffs and defendants had
pending CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980) claims. Id. at 672 n.2.
6. Id. at 672 n. 1.
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When Hoechst Celanese informed the landowners of the contamination
problems at'its parking lot, the landowners filed suit.'
In reaching its decision, the Shockley court relied primarily on common
law strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, recognized in South
Carolina since at least 1894.8 Without regard for the reasonableness of a
defendant's actions, strict liability imposes liability on one who uses land for
activities that are likely to cause injury to a neighbor, if injury actually
occurs. 9 Both the common law and the Restatement (Second) of Torts adopt
this view of strict liability.'0  However, strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activities is restricted to extraordinary or unusual activities." An
activity may be abnormally dangerous, or ultrahazardous, for two reasons:
"first, because . . . a mishap resulting in some harm to the plaintiff is very
likely to occur; second, because the activity involves an appreciable chance of
causing serious injury. " 12
The South Carolina Supreme Court has adopted the majority view, set
forth in the Restatement, that dynamite blasting is an ultrahazardous activity;
therefore, a person will incur strict liability for injuries caused by dynamite
blasting. 3 However, "[t]here is little, if any, South Carolina authority on
those activities other than blasting that would be considered abnormally
dangerous.""' Hoechst Celanese relied on Snow v. City of Columbia5 for
the proposition that the strict liability doctrine in South Carolina is limited to
blasting cases.' 6 However, in rejecting Hoechst Celanese's argument, the
7. Shockley, 793 F. Supp. at 672.
8. Id.; see Frost v. Berkeley Phosphate Co., 42 S.C. 402, 409, 20 S.E. 280, 283 (1894)
(imposing a strict liability standard on a defendant when noxious gases released from the
defendant's mill injured the plaintiff's land).
9. Frost, 42 S.C. at 409, 20 S.E. at 283.
10. "One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to
the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the
utmost care to prevent the harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(i) (1977).
11. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 78, at 546
(5th ed. 1984); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977) (listing the following
factors to determine whether an activity is abnormally dangerous: (1) degree of risk, (2)
likelihood of harm, (3) inability to eliminate risk, (4) commonality of usage, (5) inappropriateness
of activity to area, and (6) social utility of the activity itself).
12. KEETON et al., supra note 11, § 78, at 556 (footnotes omitted).
13. Wallace v. A. H. Guion & Co., 237 S.C. 349, 117 S.E.2d 359 (1960).
14. F. PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 189
(1990).
15. 305 S.C. 544, 409 S.E.2d 797 (Ct. App. 1991).
16. Shockley, 793 F. Supp. at 673. Snow involved water damage to property caused by a
leak in a city pipe, and the court held that the management of water does not fall within the
narrowly defined scope of activities considered ultrahazardous. Snow, 305 S.C. at 546-52, 409
S.E.2d at 798-800. The Snow court asserted that without fault, liability should only be imposed
under an agreement, statute, or narrowly defined common-law principle. Id. at 547-48, 409
[Vol. 45
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Shockley court stated that Snow clearly supports the rule that courts will
impose strict liability for injuries caused by abnormally dangerous or
ultrahazardous activities. 17 Although not apparent from the opinion itself, the
Shockley court possibly considered the exception whereby strict liability "does
not apply if the activity is one that is carried on in pursuance of a public
duty."" 8 The storage of hazardous wastes properly constitutes an ultrahazard-
ous activity, thereby triggering the imposition of strict liability standards, and
it does not fall within the limited public duty exception.' 9 However, on
appeal the Fourth Circuit stated that "[i]n South Carolina, the strict liability
doctrine for the most part has been confined to a small number of ultrahazard-
ous activities."20 For that reason, the Fourth Circuit held that the district
court in Shockley extended the strict liability doctrine beyond its permissible
scope as established in South Carolina and that any such change in South
Carolina's law must come from either its state courts or legislature.2'
In the district court case, Hoechst Celanese also argued that under general
principles of agency, it was insulated from liability because it simply delivered
the chemicals to Groce, an independent contractor.' However, Hoechst
Celanese fell within "a well established exception to the general rule of non-
liability where injury results and the means or manner of the activity of the
owner, whether done by independent contractor or not, may be found to be
inherently or intrinsically dangerous to others. "3 Although liability depends
upon the actual or implied prior knowledge of the employer-principal,24 the
district court found sufficient evidence of Hoechst Celanese's knowledge to
impose the exception.'
S.E.2d at 799.
17. Shockley, 793 F. Supp. at 673.
18. KEETON et al., supra note 12, § 78, at 556.
19. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 14, at 190 ("Likely candidates [for the imposition of strict
liability in South Carolina] would be activities like the ... storage of hazardous wastes.").
20. Shockley v. Hoechst Celanese, Corp., 1993 WL 241179 at *5 (citing Snow, 305 S.C. at
549-50, 409 S.E.2d at 800 and Wallace v. A. H. Guion & Co., 237 S.C. 349, 354-55, 117
S.E.2d 359, 361 (1960)).
21. Id. Recently, the South Carolina Court of Appeals refused to address this issue, calling
instead on the supreme court to do so. See Raven v. Greenville County, _ S.C. _, __, 434
S.E.2d 296, 305 (Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to adopt the Restatement's criteria for abnormally
dangerous activity).
22. Shockley, 793 F. Supp. at 673.
23. Allison v. Ideal Laundry & Cleaners, 215 S.C. 344, 350, 55 S.E.2d 281, 282 (1949).
24. Id. at 351, 55 S.E.2d at 283; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427A (1965)
(defining the exception as applicable to an employer who knows or has reason to know that the
contracted work involves abnormally dangerous activity).
25. Shockley, 793 F. Supp. at 673 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427A (1965)).
Testimony at trial indicated that Hoechst Celanese knowingly delivered the rusty, leaking barrels
for indefinite storage at Groce's reclamation plant. Id.
1993]
3
et al.: Environmental Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1993
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
In addition to strict liability, the Shockley court found Hoechst Celanese
liable for trespass.26 Trespass occurs when one intentionally enters onto the
property of another without authorization, regardless of harm.27 The
requisite intent is shown if the defendant acted voluntarily and knew or should
have known of the possible consequences of his act.28 The defendant only
need intend the act that causes the harm, not the actual harm itself.2 9
Hoechst Celanese relied on Snow for the proposition that a failure to
perform a duty is not a trespass.3" The district court quickly dismissed this
argument for two reasons. First, it found that Hoechst Celanese intended to
deliver leaking barrels and knew or should have known that environmental
contamination would result.3 Liability is imposed on one who, via an
abnormally dangerous activity, intentionally enters the plaintiffs land and
causes harm.32 Second, the Shockley court distinguished the Snow case
because the defendants in Snow lacked intent to intrude and did not engage
in an abnormally dangerous activity.33 In contrast, Hoechst Celanese
voluntarily conducted an abnormally dangerous activity, for which it should
have anticipated the consequences.34 Consequently, the jury's finding of
trespass was proper because if a defendant acted voluntarily and knew or
should have known that the particular harm would result, then the requisite
intent to trespass is proved.35
Agency law applies to an action for trespass; consequently, an employer
may be liable for the torts of its contractor. 36 An employer is liable for the
26. Id. at 673-74.
27. See generally KEETON et al., supra note 11, § 13, at 67-84 (discussing trespass to land).
28. Snow v. City of Columbia, 305 S.C. 544, 553, 409 S.E.2d 797, 802 (Ct. App. 1991)
(citing Snakenberg v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 299 S.C. 164, 383 S.E.2d 2 (Ct. App. 1989));
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) ("'[llntent'. . . denote[s] that the actor
desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it.").
29. Snow, 305 S.C. at 553, 409 S.E.2d at 802 (citing Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 121 N.E.2d
249 (N.Y. 1954) and Lee v. Stewart, 10 S.E.2d 804 (N.C. 1940)).
30. Shockley, 793 F. Supp. at 673.
31.Id. at 673-74.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 165 (1965). A trespass on land subjects a defendant
to liability for intrusions resulting from abnormally dangerous activities if actual harm results.
Id. § 165 cmt. c. ("The harm may be an impairment of the physical condition of the land or an
invasion occurring on the land of some other legally protected interest of the possessor, connected
with his interest of exclusive possession.")
33. Shockley, 793 F. Supp. at 674. In Snow the court considered a nonnegligent trespass of
water that did not involve an abnormally dangerous activity. Id.
34. Id. at 673-74.
35. Id. at 673 (citing Snow v. City of Columbia, 305 S.C. 544, 409 S.E.2d 797 (Ct. App.
1991)).
36. Id. at 674; see also supra text accompanying notes 22-25 and accompanying text
(discussing the agency theory).
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trespass of its independent contractor if the employer knew or had reason" to
know the hired work was likely to involve a trespass.37 Thus, the district
court stated that sufficient evidence existed to support the jury's finding that
Hoechst Celanese was liable for the trespass committed by Groce.38
In addition to trespass, the Shockley court upheld the jury's finding that
Hoechst Celanese was liable for nuisance.39 The difference between trespass
and nuisance "is that trespass is an invasion of the plaintiffs interest in the
exclusive possession of his land, while nuisance is an interference with his use
and enjoyment of it."4" The following factors help determine if the interfer-
ence is sufficiently unreasonable to sustain a nuisance claim: (1) the intent of
the defendant, (2) whether the interference was substantial, (3) whether the
interference would upset an ordinary person, (4) the appropriateness of the
activity in the area, (5) the manner in which the activity was conducted, and
(6) the nature and social utility of the conduct.4" Furthermore, when the
defendant is only one of many creating the nuisance, his participation must be
substantial before individual liability will attach.4 2
The jury found that Hoechst Celanese's knowing delivery of the barrels of
hazardous chemicals constituted substantial participation sufficient to impose
liability on Hoechst Celanese directly, 3 as well as indirectly for the harm
Groce caused while acting in his agency capacity." The district court in
Shockley held that the evidence properly supported the jury's nuisance
finding.45
The Shockley court further held that Hoechst Celanese could not
successfully assert that the landowners "came to the nuisance" as a defense. 6
Coming to the nuisance does not bar recovery in South Carolina, especially if
the injury continues even after the plaintiff discovers the harm.47 Dicta in
some South Carolina cases suggests that coming to the nuisance might bar a
plaintiff's recovery if the plaintiff had prior knowledge of the nuisance
37. Shockley, 793 F. Supp. at 674 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427B (1965)).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. KEETON et al., supra note 11, § 87, at 622; see also HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 14,
at 165 (defining private nuisance as an "'unreasonable interference' with the plaintiff's use and
enjoyment of land").
41. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 14, at 166-67.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 834 cmt. d (1979).
43. Shockley, 793 F. Supp. at 674.
44. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427B (1965)).
45. Id. at 674.
46. Id.
47. Carter v. Lake City Baseball Club, Inc., 218 S.C. 255, 272, 62 S.E.2d 470, 478 (1950)
(citing 39 AM. JUR. Nuisances § 197 (1942)).
19931
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(reflected in the purchase price), and the injury ultimately ceased.4" Thus,
the Shockley court properly concluded that the coming to the nuisance defense
did not bar the landowners' recovery because they were not aware of the
contamination until after purchasing the property.49
The Shockley court also upheld the imposition of liability for negligence
against both Hoechst Celanese and Groce. ° The court stated that "Hoechst
Celanese had a non-delegable duty to insure that the chemicals were disposed
of properly." 5 In Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that the defendant railroad company could not
avoid liability by delegating the chemical spraying of weeds to a contractor.
5 2
Similarly, Hoechst Celanese could not avoid liability by delegating its duty to
properly dispose of its chemicals to Groce. Further, the Shockley court relied
on Hoechst Celanese's violation of the South Carolina Pollution Control Act53
in approving the jury's finding of negligence. 54 Although not discussed in
Shockley, violation of a safety statute in South Carolina ordinarily constitutes
negligence per se.55 Finally, the Shockley court held that Hoechst Celanese
breached its duty to warn the landowners of the contamination.56
The Shockley court also rejected the contention of both Hoechst Celanese
and Groce that contributory negligence barred the landowners' recovery under
a negligence theory.57 Groce further argued that he was not liable for
negligence because the landowners assumed the risk as a matter of law when
they purchased the property.58 The landowners were under no duty to
48. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 14, at 184-85.
49. See Shockley, 793 F. Supp. at 672.
50. Id. at 674-75.
51. Id. at 675 n.4 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 416-429 (1965) and
Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 221 S.C. 477, 71 S.E.2d 299 (1952)).
52. Alexander, 221 S.C. at 487-88, 71 S.E.2d at 303-04; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 427 (1965) (stating that an employer is liable for the acts of an independent
contractor if the contracted work is inherently dangerous).
53. The Pollution Control Act is codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1-10 to -350.(Law. Co-
op. 1987 & Supp. 1992).
54. Shockley, 793 F. Supp. at 675. The South Carolina Pollution Control Act provides in
pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to throw, drain, run,
allow to seep or otherwise discharge into the environment of the State ... industrial wastes and
other wastes ...." S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-90(a) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
55. See e.g., Reed v. Clark, 277 S.C. 310, 317, 286 S.E.2d 384, 388 (1982); see also
HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 14, at 128-29 (discussing the requirements of statutory negligence
per se). But see HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 14, at 31 (Supp. 1992) (listing recent cases that
implicitly hold that negligence per se may require a knowing violation of the statute).
56. Shockley, 793 F. Supp. at 675. The restatement imposes a duty on landholders who
maintain dangerous, artificial conditions on their property to warn adjacent landholders of such
conditions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 370 (1965).
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investigate for contamination, and the evidence showed they had no prior
knowledge of the contamination. 9 The Shockley court held that although the
landowners' alleged contributory negligence was properly before the jury, they
had not assumed the risk as a matter of law.'
The district court applied established South Carolina common law in
Shockley. Although Snow appeared to limit liability for environmental torts,
the Shockley court factually distinguished the cases and rendered a sound
decision. However, because the Fourth Circuit ultimately ruled that the
federal courts may not so extend the state's strict liability doctrine, the
Shockley reasoning dealing with strict liability will not be the law in federal
court until action by a South Carolina court or the General Assembly.
Furthermore, a need still remains for a precise definition of an ultrahazardous
activity that triggers strict liability.
Jeanette P. Franklin
59. 1d. HoechstCelanese'sexperttestifiedthatenvironmentalaudits were customary in 1988,
and the landowners purchased their property in early 1989. However, on cross-examination the
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